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Executive Summary
This report contains two chapters. The first chapter, “The role of village leaders on the 
production of public goods: Evidence from South Korea,” considers the role of village 
leaders in the Korean rural development in the early 1970s. Under the New Village 
Movement (Saemaul Undong), the role of village leaders was considered as one of the 
most important factors for the success of the Movement. However, there has been few 
empirical research documenting the relationship between the leaders and their roles on the 
improvement of village through the Movement. Using novel data on the village leaders and 
Saemaul classifications, we show that villages with village leaders who had relatively better 
educational attainment tend to improve their village public goods in two years. High 
human capital of both male and female village leaders mattered for the improvement of 
public goods. The second chapter, “The Allocation of Government Grants in the 
Community Development Program,” shows that the government resource allocation in the 
1970s was not matched with outcomes of Saemaul projects. Despite government documents 
and anecdotal evidences from Saemaul practitioners that the government selectively 
provided grants only to the better-performing villages in Saemaul projects, we find that 
there is no empirical evidence that verifies the performance-based support system.
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Introduction
In this report, we empirically investigate potential factors of Korean rural development 
in the 1970s. We focus on two determinants of rural development. These are  the roles of 
village leaders and of the government cash transfers. While there have been significant 
interests in Korean rural development strategy, including Saemaul Undong (New Village 
Movement), few systematic research on this topic is available. The lack of village-level 
data is a prominent reason. In this report, we contribute to the economic development 
literature by introducing novel village-level data to analyze Korean development experience. 
This report contains two chapters. The first chapter, “The role of village leaders on the 
production of public goods: Evidence from South Korea,” considers the role of village 
leaders in the improvement of village public goods in the early 1970s. The presence of 
effective village leaders was considered as one of the most important factors for the 
success of the Saemaul Undong. However, there has been few empirical research 
documenting the relationship between the leaders and their roles on the improvement of 
village. Using novel data on the village leaders and village classifications on the 
improvement of public village goods, we show that villages with village leaders who had 
relatively better educational attainment tend to improve their village public goods in two 
years. High human capital of both male and female village leaders mattered for the 
improvement of public goods. 
The second chapter, “The Allocation of Government Grants in the Community 
Development Program,” investigates the role of government grants, or cash transfers to 
villages. This chapter poses a fundamental question on the allocation of government 
resources during the Saemaul Undong era: was the allocation of government resources 
based on merit? One of the core principles of Saemaul Undong was that the resource 
distribution is prioritized toward villages that used public resources more effectively for 
producing public goods. The analysis, however, shows that data is not consistent with the 
stated principle of resource allocation by the government at that time: the government 
resource allocation in the 1970s had little correlation with outcomes of Saemaul projects in 
previous years. This results indicate that further analysis is needed. What were the true 
motivations or the objective function of the government in resource allocation to villages? 
Once this question is satisfactorily answered, the next question will be: what is the causal 
effect of cash transfers on village outcomes?
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Chapter 1. The role of village leaders on the production of 
public goods: Evidence from South Korea
Introduction
In providing or producing public goods, the role of leaders can be critical. For 
example, communities with heterogeneous members may find it difficult to enforce social 
sanctions to punish free-riders. A leader can assume to role of enforcer to facilitate 
participation. In the Handbook of Economic Growth, Durlauf and Fafchamps (2015) argue 
that, in poor countries, collective action may act as a substitute for the state. According to 
them, there are two essential requirements for the collective action to work: leadership and 
trust. They argue that leaders can raise level of trust as well as reducing free-rider 
problem by persuading community members to contribute voluntarily. 
In this paper, we focus on educational attainment as an important characteristics of 
leaders. Krishna (2001) provides an example from India. To get more resources from the 
government for their villages, village leaders need to know schemes and programs. They 
are required to negotiate demands with government officials successfully. Similarly, Korean 
village leaders were active negotiators with government officials as well as interpreters of 
government policies and directives (Han 2012). These kinds of skills require high levels of 
human capital.    
This paper introduces novel data on leader characteristics of most of villages within a 
province in Korea. Combining this data set with village classifications which measure the 
improvement of village public goods, we show that an objective measure of leader 
characteristics, educational attainment, matter for improvement of village public goods. 
While there has been a large body of literature documenting the role of trust in provision 
of public goods, there has been surprisingly few research on the role of leaders. One 
important reason is that, except national leaders, it is difficult to get data on leader 
characteristics.
Our empirical analysis shows that Korean villages with leaders who have more than 
elementary school degree tend to improve public goods. The results were robust to various 
controls such as the number of households in the village, or township fixed effects. To 
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account for the unobserved time-invariant characteristics that may confound the results, we 
also use village fixed effects. While the statistical significance is weaker, the point 
estimates survive. This indicates that the results were not driven mostly by village-level 
unobserved confounders.
Our paper contributes to the development economics literature. To our knowledge, our 
paper is one of few to show that the leader characteristics may matter for the 
improvement of public goods. Related papers are Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) who 
used gender composition as a determinant of the type of public goods. Another paper, 
Jones and Olken (2005), showed that changes in national leaders had impacts on economic 
growth. Additionally, our research is related to the political economy literature on role of 
leaders. Typically, the national leaders were considered with the cross-country analysis 
which makes it difficult to control for many dimensions of country heterogeneity other 
than leaders (e.g., Jones and Olken, 2005). Our context provides a better empirical design. 
Even among very homogeneous villages within the same country, and the same township, 
we show that leaders matter. Finally, our paper is also related to business literature on the 
roles of business leaders on firm’s performance (Johnson et al., 1985; Bertrand and Schoar, 
2003). 
Additionally, our paper contributes on the Saemaul Undong, or New Village 
Movement, literature. While there has been much attention to Korean rural development, 
there has been little systematical research on what factors contributed to the success of 
Saemaul. This paper follows a recent trend of using micro-data to evaluate factors that 
determined Movement’s outcomes (e.g., Kim 2015; Seo 2018; Yang 2019). 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide brief background information 
on Korean villages and New Village Movement. In Section 3, we introduce empirical 
strategy. Data used in the paper are presented in Section 4. Section 5 provides results, 
followed by concluding remarks in Section 6.
Background 
New Village Movement, or Saemaul Undong, is a large-scale rural development and 
village mobilization project under the rule of Park Chung Hee in the 1970s in South 
Korea. The key objective of the Movement was to improve village environment and the 
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increase of income of village members. The Korean government provided cash transfers 
and materials. However, the choice of village projects was supposed to be decided by 
village members themselves. Moreover, labor needs to supplied by themselves. 
Under the Movement, villages are classified with a set of achievements such as 
widening roads, improving thatched roofs, etc. Once they achieve the objective, the village 
progresses from a C grade village (Gicho in Korean, or Basic villages) to a B grade 
village (Self-help villages) and finally to an A grade village (Self-reliant villages). 
The most frequent village projects under the Movement is improving conditions of 
village roads. This can be observed from both demand and supply side of the village 
projects. First, from the demand side, according to a government survey in the 1970s, the 
most frequent priority projects mentioned by the village members were: 1) widening and 
straightening village access roads; 2) repairing and building village bridges; 3) widening 
and straightening roads in village; 4) improving sewage system; and 5) to install modern 
roofs (Park 1998). From the supply side, again, the largest portion of labor was used for 
improving roads. In 1973, out of about 36 million labor days contributed for village 
projects, more than 80% (29 million) days were devoted in road works according to a 
government statistics (Ministry of Home Affairs, 1973, p.116). 
Important decisions on village matters are typically determined by the village 
development committee which consists of a dozen committee members from the village, as 
well as heads of households. For example, the committee propose a project and heads of 
the households decides democratically through voting in village meetings. 
In decision making process, village leaders had significant roles. In a survey of village 
leaders who received awards for their achievements in 1975, they responded that the most 
important role of leaders is 1) to gain consensus and to successfully persuade village 
members; 2) to write meticulous plans for village projects; and 3) to assist village committee 
meetings so that important decisions to be made democratically (Park 1974). Leaders also 
provided reasonable target outcomes that villagers were able to meet (Han 2012). 
When the government did a survey to understand the factor behind successful villages 
(i.e., getting an A or a B grades), the found out that successful villages usually had 
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motivated village leaders. Under the Movement, each village had designated male and 
female village leaders. These leaders are different from village head (Ri Jiang in Korean) 
who was a primary contact point with township officials and did administrative work 
related with village matters. Saemaul leaders, which is the focus of this study, had a 
different objective which is to increase village public goods and village incomes.
More educational attainment of village leaders could be helpful. For example, village 
leaders often negotiated with government officials for getting more resources. Additionally, 
leaders interpreted government policies and directives to village members which might be 
useful for increasing public goods (Han 2012). Additionally, having technical knowledge 
that they gained from schools, such as an agricultural high school, could be helpful in 
adopting better technology for improving agricultural income. Planning and executing 
complex projects such as improving village roads or bridge construction may also require 
higher human capital. In this paper, we attempt to use village-level data as well as leader 
characteristics to find out whether there was indeed a systematic tendency of better village 
outcomes when leaders had higher human capital. 
Empirical strategy
Our research question is whether the more educational attainment is associated with 
more production of village public goods. For empirical test, we use the following specification,
where is the improvement of village public goods between 1972 and 1974 of village i,  
is the education level of the male village leader of village i, is a vector of controls, and  
represents township fixed effects.
The improvement of village public goods, , is measured as a dummy variable. If there 
was an improvement in Saemaul classification between 1972 and 1974 for village i, the 
dummy is equal to one, and zero otherwise. For example, if a village improves the grade 
from a C to a B, from a C to an A, or from a B to an A between these two years, the 
dummy will have the value of one. If the grade of the village remains the same, then 
there was no improvement and the dummy will record zero. 
For those village which already has an A grade in 1972, no further improvement in 
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classification is possible, even though the village improves public goods. Additionally, 
given that the classification will be based on some cutoffs, despite there were some 
progress made, the grade may stay the same. These may underestimate the effect, .
The identifying assumption is that, once we have sufficient observable village 
characteristics and unobserved characteristics that are invariant at the township level, the 
human capital of the male village leader is orthogonal to other unobserved determinants of 
. Hence,  can be considered as a causal effect of the human capital of village leader on 
the improvement of village public goods.
As a robustness check, we additionally include village fixed effects to account for 
time-invariant unobserved village confounders as below:
where is the village fixed effects.
Data 
We digitize and use novel village-level data for the analysis. The first data set is the 
information of village leaders for each village in the province of the province of 
Kyungsangnam-do. the province of Kyungsangnam-do is located in southeastern part of 
South Korea (see Figure A1 in the Appendix for the location of the province). This data 
set is obtained from Saemaul Training Center. Figure 1-1 shows the example of a page of 
the data of village leaders. Villages were first classified with grades, A, B, and C. Then 
for each grade the data contain the information on the name of the village, the number of 
households, population, the name of township and county that the village belongs to, etc. 
Importantly, it contains the name, occupation, age, and the village role of the male and 
female village leader in each village. It has three years, 1972, 1974, and 1975. To our 
knowledge, this is the only data set which contains village-level Saemual village 
classifications for three years. Having three years is useful to document the progress of 
each village.
The second data set we digitize is Saemaul Chongram, or the New Village 
Comprehensive Survey (NVCS henceforth), published by the Ministry of Interior in 1972. 
This dataset contains a wide variety of village characteristics which can be used as control 
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variables for our analysis. Yang (2019) digitizes and uses the same source of data in a 
different province. Figure 1-2 shows an example of information contained in NVCS. This 
data contains the share of agricultural households, the average cultivated area per 
household, population under age 14, population above age 14, distance from the township 
government office, etc. This is a cross-sectional data in 1971, before our study period.
Additionally, NVCS has village-level information from village maps (upper-left on 
Figure 1-2). The maps show indicators on whether the village has access to electricity, 
access to phone line, access to vehicles, whether a school exists, etc. We created dummy 
variables using the map information and included them as control variables in the analysis. 
Figure 1-3 provides the map legends as well as translations.   
We construct two datasets using these two sources. First, we merged these two data 
sets as a wide-format cross-sectional data since two datasets has information on the 
common year of 1972. Using the county, township, and village name, we merged these 
two data sets together for the year 1972. The NVCS is available for the universe of 
villages of all provinces in Korea in 1972. On the other hand, Village Leader data are 
only available for the province of Kyungsangnam-do . 
There are 5,044 villages in Kyungsangnam-do according to the NVCS. On the other 
hand, Village Leader data have total 3,690 villages, which means Village Leader covers 
73% of all villages in the province and 27% are missing. There could be a potential 
selection bias. However, in many observable characteristics, the NVCS villages (5,044) and 
Village Leader data villages (3,690) did not differ much. For example, the average number 
of households is 83.5 for the former, and it was 86.1 for the latter. Similarly, the average 
cultivated area per household, it was 0.74 hectare v.s. 0.73. For the average distance from 
the township office, it was 4.1 km v.s. 4.0.
Out of 3,690 villages in the Village Leader data, we were able to merge all except 7 
villages with the New Village Comprehensive Survey data. This merged dataset allows to 
control for many village-level variables available from the NVCS. For this dataset,  is 
generated by using the village grades in 1972 and in 1974. When there were 
improvements in village grades, then the outcome variable was recorded as one and zero 
otherwise.
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Our second dataset is a panel dataset. The Village Leader data cover three years, 
1972, 1974, and 1975. Therefore, each village has three observations from these three 
different years. By combining these three years at the village level, we were able to 
generate a panel data set. Since our outcome variable is the  we lose 1975 and keep two 
years. For year 1972,  is the change in grades between 1972 and 1974. For  in 1974, it 
is change in grades between 1974 and 1975. Since the NVCS only covers 1972, we are 
not able to extensively control for village characteristics for this dataset. However, this 
data set allows us to control for unobserved, time-invariant village characteristics.
There are some shortcomings of this panel dataset.  in 1972 shows improvement in a 
two-year interval, 1972 and 1974. On the other hand,  in 1974 shows improvement in 
grades in a one-year interval, 1974 and 1975. Additionally, in 1972, a large share of 
villages had a C grade (73%). In 1974, only 32% of villages had a C grade. As a result, 
there is much less variation in  for year 1974. Only 16% had . In 1972, 36% of villages 
had 1. For these reasons, we use the panel data set as a robustness check and use 
wide-form cross-sectional data as the main data for the empirical analysis.  
Table 1-1 shows summary statistics for the wide-form data in 1972. There are striking 
differences in the educational attainment of village leaders depending on the gender. For 
male leaders, about half of them (48%) had the elementary school as the final degree. 
28% of them had junior high school degree, 20% had high school degrees, and 3% had 
college degrees. For female leaders, a majority of them (80%) had elementary school 
degree. Only 14% had junior high school degree, and 4% had high school degree. Only 
0.2% had college degree. There was little difference in average age. The male leaders 
were on average 40.7 years old, whereas the female leaders were 38.5 years old.
Village characteristics shows that these villages are largely agricultural and small. More 
than 80% of households had agriculture as the main occupation. On average, there were 
about 85 households in a village. Their agricultural plots are small. The average cultivated 
area per household is 0.73 hectare.
Access to modern infrastructure or government-provided public goods were modest. 
Only 11% had tap water supply access. Electricity access is only 37%. Cars cannot enter 
the half of the villages (50%).
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Figure A1 in the Appendix compares the summary statistics between different Saemaul 
grades in 1972. As seen from the table, a large fraction of variables has similar mean 
values regardless of grades. There are some differences for male leader characteristics. For 
example, the fraction of village leaders with a junior high school degree was 25% for 
B-grade villages. For A- and C-grade villages, the number was 29%. Female leader 
characteristics were quite similar across different grades. The most significant differences 
were observed in the number of households and population. A-grade villages had 84 
households on average, while B-grade and C-grade villages had 112 and 79 households, 
respectively. In terms of population, A-, B- and C-grade villages had 489, 641, and 454 
village members, respectively. Another set of variables with relatively larger differences are 
related to village public goods such as electricity, tap water supply, presence of schools, 
etc. However, there was little systematically monotonic relationship between presence of 
public goods and grades. For example, B-grade villages had the highest level of electricity 
accessibility and presence of schools.
Figure 1-1| Dataset of Village Leaders
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Figure 1-2| New Village Comprehensive Survey
Figure 1-3| Map Legend from New Village Comprehensive Survey
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Table 1-1| Summary Statistics
Mean SD Min Max
Dependent Variable
 0.36 0.48 0 1
Male Leader Characteristics
Elementary school dummy 0.48 0.50 0 1
Junior high school dummy 0.28 0.45 0 1
High school dummy 0.20 0.40 0 1
College dummy 0.03 0.16 0 1
Leader age 40.7 8.1 18 72
Female Leader Characteristics
Elementary school dummy 0.80 0.40 0 1
Junior high school dummy 0.14 0.35 0 1
High school dummy 0.04 0.20 0 1
College dummy 0.002 0.05 0 1
Leader age 38.5 7.1 17 72
Village Characteristics
Number of households 85.0 0.82 0 860
Population 489.1 358.5 0 5,051
Population per household 5.83 0.82 0.64 32.67
Fraction of agricultural households 0.86 0.18 0 1
Fraction of population with age below 14 0.40 0.07 0.04 1
Average cultivated area per household (ha) 0.73 0.31 0.02 6.2
Fraction of modern roofs 0.39 0.22 0 1
Number of hamlets 1.76 1.38 1 51
Distance from township office (km) 4.03 3.64 0 61
River passes through village (dummy) 0.37 0.48 0 1
Railroad passes through village (dummy)  0.05 0.21 0 1
Highway passes through village (dummy) 0.03 0.16 0 1
National road passes through village (dummy) 0.16 0.37 0 1
Regional road passes through village (dummy) 0.26 0.44 0 1
County road passes through village (dummy) 0.15 0.36 0 1
Historical monuments in village (dummy) 0.02 0.14 0 1
Public offices in village (dummy) 0.06 0.23 0 1
School in village (dummy) 0.16 0.37 0 1
Village office in village (dummy) 0.92 0.27 0 1
Township office in village (dummy) 0.05 0.21 0 1
Village with electricity access (dummy) 0.37 0.48 0 1
Village with landline phone access (dummy) 0.16 0.36 0 1
Village with tap water supply (dummy) 0.11 0.31 0 1
Village where cars can enter (dummy) 0.50 0.50 0 1
Village with high mountain (dummy) 0.08 0.28 0 1
Village with main occupation is agriculture (dummy) 0.82 0.39 0 1
Observations 3,566
Note: The unit of observation is village. Data are from the Village Leader List and the New Village 
Comprehensive Survey. The  variable equals one if a village’s Saemaul classification grade improves 
between 1972 and 1974 and zero otherwise. Junior high school dummy equals one if the village male 
leader’s final education degree from a junior high school and zero otherwise. High school dummy and 
college dummy are similarly defined. 
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Results 
We found that there was a robust relationship between educational attainment of village 
leaders and the improvements of public goods in a variety of empirical specifications. 
Furthermore, we show that education levels higher than elementary schooling of both male 
and female leaders matter.
Table 1-1 shows the main regression results on the relationship between male leaders’ 
education level and the improvement in public goods. Here the dummies are used to 
indicate the levels of education, junior high school, high school, and college degree 
dummies. The reference group is the leaders with just an elementary school degree which 
is omitted. Therefore, the coefficients of these dummies are interpreted as the increase in 
the probability of improvement of Saemaul grades relative to village leaders with 
elementary school degrees. 
The overall results indicate that having more than elementary school degrees of a male 
village leader is associated with about 4-5% increase in probability of improving Saemaul 
grades in two years. Column (1) includes these educational level dummies without any 
control variables. Column (2) includes village-level control variables, which were introduced 
in summary statistics (Table 1-1). These includes the leader’s age (and its square term), 
village demographic variables such as the number of village households (and its square 
term), share of agricultural households, the share of population below age 14, and a proxy 
for income such as the average cultivated area per household, access to transportation 
infrastructure, such as whether different classes of roads passes through the village or the 
existence of government-provided public goods such as electricity or tap water access. 
Column (3) includes township fixed effects without any other control variables. Column (4) 
includes both full controls and township fixed effects. This is the most preferred 
specification. In column (5), instead of having many education dummies, it includes a 
single dummy, “above elementary school dummy” which equals one if the village leader 
has more than elementary school education and zero otherwise.
In column (1), it shows that having a junior high school degree increases the chance 
of Samaul grade improvement about 4.4%, compared with elementary school educated 
village leaders. The coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level. The magnitude is 
also strong, given that the mean of the outcome variable is 36%. Having high school 
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degree had similar effects of 4.4%. Having a college degree has a higher magnitude of 
5%, but it was not statistically significant. In other columns, the magnitude is highly 
consistent and robust. The coefficients do not vary much regardless of addition of controls 
and fixed effects. F-test of the equality of the coefficients of high school dummy and 
junior high school dummy shows that we cannot reject that these two estimates are equal 
(p-value of 0.88).
For female village leaders, we also observed a positive association between higher 
education attainment of leaders and the Saemaul grade improvements. The specifications are 
identical to the empirical analysis of male leaders. The difference is using female leaders’ 
education levels instead of male leaders’ levels. Similar to the results of male leaders, 
F-test of the equality of the coefficients of high school dummy and junior high school 
dummy shows that we cannot reject that these two estimates are equal (p-value of 0.87). 
In our preferred specification (column 4), we document that having more than elementary 
school education of female leaders increase the chance of the improvement of Saemaul 
grades by 6% compared to elementary school educated village leaders. We have similar 
conclusion drawn from the results of column (5) which uses “above elementary school 
dummy.” These interpretation applies to village leaders with junior high school or high 
school degrees. 
Since there are very few leaders with college degrees (0.2%), The statistically 
insignificant 19% increase of college-educated leaders are not meaningful. Another 
reservation, compared to results of male leaders, is that the coefficients varies depending 
on the specifications. For example, junior high school dummy has the coefficient of 0.018 
when no controls are included. The magnitude was not statistically significant. When full 
controls are used, the coefficient becomes 0.044, and it became statistically significant at 
5% level. When only country fixed effects are used, the coefficient becomes 0.036 and not 
statistically significant. When fully controlled and township fixed effects are added, the 
coefficient becomes 0.6. These results indicate that there might be stronger selection of 
highly educated female leaders compared to male leaders. 
We also include education dummies of both male and female leaders (Table A2). In 
the preferred specifications with full controls, the results were broadly similar compared to 
separate regression results in Table 1-1 and Table 1-2. Both relatively high levels of the 
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male and the female leader mattered. And the magnitude of the education level of female 
leaders were bigger. 
While we extensively control for village characteristics, there is still concern that the 
selection of village leaders may be influenced by unobserved village level characteristics 
such as village institutions, decision-making process, overall education level, social capital, 
etc. Using the panel structure of Village Leader Dataset, we use village fixed effects as a 
robustness check to validate whether the association between educational attainment of 
leaders and the improvement of public goods are driven by some unobserved third factors. 
Table 1-3 and 1-4 show these results for male leaders and female leaders, respectively. 
In Table 1-3, column (1) replicates the results with the most preferred specification shown 
in column (4) of Table 1-1. Similarly, column (3) replicates results from column (5) of 
Table 1-1 for the purpose of comparisons. Column (2) shows the results using village 
fixed effects. There are two years of observations for each village in this panel, 1972 and 
1974. While the coefficient loses statistical significance, the coefficient still retains the 
magnitude of about 0.04. Results were similar when “above elementary school dummy” 
were used instead. Compared to the main regression coefficient of 0.049, the coefficient 
from panel analysis shows 0.043. Similarly, for female leaders, the coefficients using panel 
data has slightly reduced magnitude of around 0.055 instead of around 0.06 for junior high 
school dummy and “above elementary school dummy.” Table A3 in the Appendix shows 
results when education dummies of both male and female leaders are added. The 
coefficients of education dummies are similar those using single-gender regressions.
In the traditional Saemaul literature, the role of male leaders was typically emphasized 
whereas the roles of female leaders were less discussed. Han (2012) describes the role of 
female leaders in eradicating gambling, and liquor shops, and encouragement of saving. All 
these are related to postponing immediate consumption and investing in future which may 
provide crucial village funds for village projects. However, we still have limited historical 
documents to shed more light on why female leaders mattered. The results of this paper 
may be an initial step to uncover the roles of female leaders further. 
Moreover, even for male leaders, we do not have clear evidence on the potential 
mechanisms through which education may play a role in successful village projects. Is this 
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through better coordination with government officials? Is it because village leaders with 
better education have more technical knowledge on modern agriculture? Or is that the 
average community members had more respect for highly educated leaders and follow them 
given the strong influence of Confucianism which emphasizes education? We do not have 
sufficient knowledge on these either.
Table 1-1| Main Regression Results (male leader)
Variable
Dependent variable:  (mean: 0.36, SD: 0.48)


































Full Controls N Y N Y Y




Observations 3,566 3,543 3,566 3,543 3,543
R2 0.002 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.12
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors in Column (3)-(5) are clustered at the township level. 
Data are from the Village Leader List and the New Village Comprehensive Survey. The  variable equals one 
if a village’s Saemaul classification grade improves between 1972 and 1974 and zero otherwise. Junior high 
school dummy equals one if the village male leader’s final education degree from a junior high school and 
zero otherwise. High school dummy and college dummy are similarly defined. Above elementary school 
dummy equals one if the village male leader’s educational attainment is above elementary school. In all 
specifications, the reference group is the villages whose male leaders have an elementary school degree.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 1-2| Main Regression Results (female leader)
Variable
Dependent variable:  (mean: 0.36, SD: 0.48)



































Full Controls N Y N Y Y
Township FE N N Y Y Y
Number of 
Townships 217 217 217
Observations 3,566 3,546 3,566 3,546 3,546
R2 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.11
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors in Column (3)-(5) are clustered at the township level. 
Data are from the Village Leader List and the New Village Comprehensive Survey. The  variable equals one 
if a village’s Saemaul classification grade improves between 1972 and 1974 and zero otherwise. Junior high 
school dummy equals one if the village female leader’s final education degree from a junior high school and 
zero otherwise. High school dummy and college dummy are similarly defined. Above elementary school 
dummy equals one if the village female leader’s educational attainment is above elementary school. In all 
specifications, the reference group is the villages whose female leaders have an elementary school degree.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
20
Table 1-3| Robustness Checks (male leader)
Variable
Dependent variable:  (mean: 0.36, SD: 0.48)
(1) (2) (3) (4)





















Full Controls Y Y
Township FE Y Y
Number of Townships 217 217
Village FE N Y Y
Observations 3,546 7,145 3,543 7,145
R2 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.13
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors in Column (1) and (3) are clustered at the township 
level. Data are from the Village Leader List and the New Village Comprehensive Survey. The  variable 
equals one if a village’s Saemaul classification grade improves between 1972 and 1974 and zero otherwise 
if the observation is in 1972. If the observation is in 1974,  variable equals one if a village’s Saemaul 
classification grade improves between 1974 and 1975 and zero otherwise. Junior high school dummy equals 
one if the village male leader’s final education degree from a junior high school and zero otherwise. High 
school dummy and college dummy are similarly defined. Above elementary school dummy equals one if the 
village male leader’s educational attainment is above elementary school. In all specifications, the reference 
group is the villages whose male leaders have an elementary school degree.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 1-4| Robustness Checks (female leader)
Variable Dependent variable:  (mean: 0.36, SD: 0.48)
(1) (2) (3) (4)





















Full Controls Y Y
Township FE Y Y
Number of Townships 217 217
Village FE N Y Y
Observations 3,543 6,703 3,546 6,703
R2 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors in Column (1) and (3) are clustered at the township 
level. Data are from the Village Leader List and the New Village Comprehensive Survey. The  variable 
equals one if a village’s Saemaul classification grade improves between 1972 and 1974 and zero otherwise 
if the observation is in 1972. If the observation is in 1974,  variable equals one if a village’s Saemaul 
classification grade improves between 1974 and 1975 and zero otherwise. Junior high school dummy equals 
one if the village female leader’s final education degree from a junior high school and zero otherwise. High 
school dummy and college dummy are similarly defined. Above elementary school dummy equals one if the 
village female leader’s educational attainment is above elementary school. In all specifications, the reference 
group is the villages whose female leaders have an elementary school degree.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Conclusions 
In this study, we analyzed the under-researched question of the role of leaders in the 
production of public goods. Using New Village Movement during the 1970s as the context 
of study, we investigated whether the human capital of village leaders play a role in 
improving village public goods. We find that more education of a village leader is 
associated with a higher probability that village will improve public goods. The results 
were robust to a variety of controls and specifications. Education levels of both male and 
female leaders mattered. The magnitude of the higher education effects for both sexes were 
substantial and statistically significant. 
We acknowledge limitations. There are several aspects of leadership. Intelligence, 
devotion, motivation, personal charm, charisma, or social networks are other potentially 
important characteristics. However, we do not have these measures. In fact, these might be 
characteristics that are hard to measure objectively or accurately. Also, we rely on Saemaul 
classifications as the measure of public goods. There will be measurement errors which we 
do not have detailed information. We only have village grades, but not the actual measures 
of public goods that determines these grades. Finally, even though we extensively control 
for potential confounding characteristics, both observable and unobservable, concerns still 
remain on potential factors unaccounted for which may invalidate the results of the study.
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Appendix
Figure A1| Map of South Korea (Kyungsangnam-do highlighted)
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 0.36 0 0.13 0.47
- Male Leader Characteristics
Elementary school dummy 0.48 0.45 0.51 0.47
Junior high school dummy 0.28 0.29 0.25 0.29
High school dummy 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.19
College dummy 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03
Leader age 40.7 40.0 42.1 40.2
- Female Leader Characteristics
Elementary school dummy 0.80 0.80 0.78 0.81
Junior high school dummy 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.14
High school dummy 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04
College dummy 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002
Leader age 38.5 38.0 38.3 38.6
- Village Characteristics
Number of households 85.0 83.8 112.0 78.9
Population 489.1 488.8 640.5 454.3
Population per household 5.83 5.87 5.76 5.84
Fraction of agricultural households 0.86 0.88 0.85 0.85
Fraction of population with age below 14 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.40
Average cultivated area per household (ha) 0.73 0.72 0.70 0.74
Fraction of modern roofs 0.39 0.57 0.41 0.36
Number of hamlets 1.76 1.58 1.99 1.73
Distance from township office (km) 4.03 3.58 3.53 4.23
River passes through village (dummy) 0.37 0.39 0.36 0.36
Railroad passes through village (dummy) 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05
Highway passes through village (dummy) 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03
National road passes through village (dummy) 0.16 0.19 0.21 0.14
Regional road passes through village (dummy) 0.26 0.30 0.30 0.25
County road passes through village (dummy) 0.15 0.16 0.20 0.14
Historical monuments in village (dummy) 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02
Public offices in village (dummy) 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.05
School in village (dummy) 0.16 0.18 0.22 0.15
Village office in village (dummy) 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.93
Township office in village (dummy) 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.04
Village with electricity access (dummy) 0.37 0.46 0.47 0.33
Village with landline phone access (dummy) 0.16 0.16 0.20 0.15
Village with tap water supply (dummy) 0.11 0.18 0.14 0.09
Village where cars can enter (dummy) 0.50 0.61 0.60 0.46
Village with high mountain (dummy) 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.08
Village with main occupation is agriculture (dummy) 0.82 0.83 0.79 0.82
Observations 3,566 388 593 2,585
Note: The unit of observation is village. Data are from the Village Leader List and the New Village 
Comprehensive Survey. The  variable equals one if a village’s Saemaul classification grade improves 
between 1972 and 1974 and zero otherwise. Junior high school dummy equals one if the village male 
leader’s final education degree from a junior high school and zero otherwise. High school dummy and 
college dummy are similarly defined. 
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Table A2| Main Regression Results (both male and female leader)
Variable
Dependent variable:  (mean: 0.36, SD: 0.48)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Male leader’s education

























































Full Controls N Y N Y Y
Township FE N N Y Y Y
Number of Townships 217 217 217
Observations 3,566 3,543 3,566 3,541 3,541
R2 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.15 0.15
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors in Column (3)-(5) are clustered at the township level. 
Data are from the Village Leader List and the New Village Comprehensive Survey. The  variable equals one 
if a village’s Saemaul classification grade improves between 1972 and 1974 and zero otherwise. Junior high 
school dummy equals one if the village the leader’s final education degree from a junior high school and 
zero otherwise. High school dummy and college dummy are similarly defined. Above elementary school 
dummy equals one if the village leader’s educational attainment is above elementary school. In all 
specifications, the reference group is the villages whose male leaders have an elementary school degree.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A3| Robustness Checks (both male and female leader)
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors in Column (1) and (3) are clustered at the township 
level. Data are from the Village Leader List and the New Village Comprehensive Survey. The  variable 
equals one if a village’s Saemaul classification grade improves between 1972 and 1974 and zero otherwise 
if the observation is in 1972. If the observation is in 1974,  variable equals one if a village’s Saemaul 
classification grade improves between 1974 and 1975 and zero otherwise. Junior high school dummy equals 
one if the village leader’s final education degree from a junior high school and zero otherwise. High school 
dummy and college dummy are similarly defined. Above elementary school dummy equals one if the village 
leader’s educational attainment is above elementary school. In all specifications, the reference group is the 
villages whose female leaders have an elementary school degree.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Variable
Dependent variable:  (mean: 0.36, SD: 0.48)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male leader’s education











































Full Controls Y Y
Township FE Y Y
Number of Townships 217 217
Village FE N Y Y
Observations 3,541 6,698 3,541 6,698
R2 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.12
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Chapter 2
The Allocation of Government Grants in the Community 
Development Program1)
Introduction
Efficient resource allocation is one of the fundamental issues in public finance. Public 
resources have tended to be allocated based mainly on three motivations: capitation, 
economic objectives or political consideration. There are many debates whether the 
allocation of public resources is motivated by political, social or economic objectives. 
During the New Deal, for instance, the federal government allocated massive expenditure 
across states for support of social welfare and other programs. Anderson and Tollison 
(1991) find that while spending allocations were correlated with indicators of the relative 
geographic severity of the Depression, indicators of relative political influence also seem to 
be strongly related spending patterns. Wallis (1996) shows that during the 1930s both 
political and economic effects were important determinants of grant allocation.
During the Saemaul Undong the government allocated huge grants across villages. 
According to government documents and anecdotal evidences from Saemaul practitioners, 
the government selectively provided grants only to the better-performing villages compared 
to the previous year’s performance of Saemaul projects. It would be worthy of compliment 
considering that political bias and corruption in resources allocation have been rather 
universal in many developing countries. However, there is no empirical evidence that 
verifies the performance-based support system. Kim (2015) shows that the government 
resource allocation in the 1970s was not matched with outcomes of Saemaul projects. Her 
empirical analysis is limited in that she only matches the number of better-performing 
villages with the number of awarded villages because of lack of data. 
This study is in line with Kim (2015) using augmented dataset and aims to investigate 
the mechanism that guided the resource allocation across villages in the nation-wide 
community development program of Saemaul Undong. To identify whether the government 
distributed grants selectively to better-performing villages or not, simple matching and logit 
1) 이 논문은 김선진(2015)의 박사학위 논문 제 3 장의 내용을 수정 보완한 것이다.
The role of village leaders and the allocation of government grants on the South Korean rural development  29
model is employed using the sample data from the Kyungsangnam-do province in the 
1970s.
The Saemaul Evaluation System and Government Grants
The government classified rural villages into three categories based on the visible 
changes of villages after the implementation of Saemaul projects and provided the 
preferential support to outstanding villages. Eight dimensions of outcome changes were 
considered to categorize villages as “Basic”, “Self-help” and “Self-reliant” villages: village 
roads, farm roads, river arrangement, irrigation, agricultural machine, cooperative farming, 
village fund, and household income (See Table 1). In order to correctly assess the 
outcomes of Saemaul projects, central and local government officials frequently visited rural 
villages and cross-checked results of the village projects. Goh Kun2), Former Prime 
Minister of Korea, said that “One of the most challenging parts of the Saemaul Undong 
was evaluating projects performance of rural villages”. 
The local government provided materials and guidelines for the next step tailored to 
the development status of villages. For the Basic villages, the lowest level in the 
development status, the government tried to encourage self-help spirits first among village 
members with simple projects implementation for the improvement of living condition 
while focusing on the non-farming income generation activities for the Self-help villages. 
Once the villages reached the highest development stage, Self-reliant villages, the priority 
was to improve the quality of life by increasing social and cultural wellbeing of village 
members. 
By early 1973, for example, the government classified villages based on the outcome 
of Saemaul projects in 1972. For 18,415 Basic villages, easy projects such as farm roads 
constructions and roof improvement projects were encouraged and supported by the 
government while for about 13,943 Self-help villages, the government supported high-cost 
projects such as electrification and local amenities. For 2,307 Self-reliant villages, 
guidelines and support for doing business for the higher income generation were provided 
(See Table 2).
    
2) He played the key role in planning and designing Saemaul projects as Director of the Saemaul Bureau during 1971-75. 
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The government supports are divided by grant support and project support and the 
government provided total grants of KRW 57,183 million (USD 50 million) for 39,932 
outstanding villages from 1972 to 1979. The government supports were classified into 
Saemaul project grants, outstanding village grants, rivulet arrangement grants, electrification 
grants, special village grants, success case of village grants and simultaneous support grants 
from 1974 to 1979 (See Table 3). The type of supports varied by year, however, Saemaul 
project grants, outstanding village grants, rivulet arrangement grants, and electrification 
grants were provided in a consistent manner. Saemaul project grants are the greater part of 
the government support and a fixed amount of KRW one million (USD 1,000) is 
distributed for a village. The number of grant awarded villages and the amount of the 
government grants reached its peak in 1976 (See Table 3 and Figure 1).
 
The share of villages categorized as Self-reliant started to increase rapidly after 1975 
while there were no marked geographic differences in the spatial diffusion of Self-reliant 
villages particularly during the first half of the 1970s (See Figure 2). By 1979, almost 
every region reached the highest levels of equilibrium in that 97 percent of total villages 
were classified as Self-reliant villages, compared to only 7 percent in 1972 (See Table 2). 
Basic villages had disappeared by 1976. At the final stage of Saemaul Undong in the late 
1970s, all the rural villages were promoted to Self-help and Self-reliant levels3) (See 
Figure 2). Along with the development of village living environment and infrastructure 
through the implementation of Saemaul projects, rural household income had increased and 
exceeded that of urban wage rate since 1974 (See Table 4). 
Empirical Analysis
Model
To identify whether the government distributed grants selectively to better or 
high-performing villages which showed the remarkable improvement compared to the 
previous year, simple data matching with dummy variables and logit estimation methods 
are employed. First, using the village performance of three stages including Basic, 
Self-help, and Self-reliant, we create a dummy variable. Villages promoted to the next 
3) By 1980, the government set the different criteria to newly categorize villages as “Self-reliant”, “Self-employed”, and 
“Welfare villages” adapting to changing household income and living environment in rural villages. According to the 
Ministry of Home Affairs, the Self-reliant village is equipped with improved production infrastructure and living 
infrastructure while the Self-employed village has capacities to manage the business for themselves. In order to become 
a Welfare village, the household income should be more than 4 million KRW (1980. 11. 11, Maeil Business 
Newspaper).
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development stage are considered to be one, and zero otherwise. These villages are 
matched with villages awarded by the government grants. The villages which are supported 
by grants are categorized as dummy equal to one if a village is awarded by grants. 
Therefore, there are four possible combinations such as (0,0), (0,1), (1,0), and (1,1), and if 
the null hypothesis is true, which means, the cases are either (0,0) or (1,1), then the 
government grants were distributed selectively only to better-performing villages.
As a robustness check, we additionally see whether the community project performance 
is associated with the government support. We employ the following estimation equation, 
where , dependent variable, is a binary variable equal to unity if a village i was 
supported by government grant during the year t, and zero otherwise. The explanatory 
variable of interest  is a dummy that shows whether the development level of village is 
increased or not at the village i at the previous year. That is, we check the change of 
village level from 1974 to 1975 and see the relation with government grants awarded in 
1975. The vector of explanatory variables which show the village characteristics such as 
ratio of farm households, existence of highway, railway, and river, distance to township 
office, existence of government offices are controlled. 
In defining “better or high-performing villages, two assumptions regarding the Saemaul 
performance indicators are considered; first, villages which show outstanding changes are 
promoted by no more than one level in a year. If a village was categorized as a Basic 
village, the lowest level among three levels, in the year t, it is not possible to directly 
become a Self-reliant village, the highest level among three, in the year t+1 even though 
the village shows highly remarkable improvement within one year. Second, development 
level of villages has never retreated. Once a village becomes the Self-help village, for 
instance, the village never drops to the level of the Basic village again. Villages move 
only towards upper levels.
Data
Data are constructed at a village level drawn from the Statistics Year book of Saemaul 
from 1974-79, Saemaul Chongram, and Saemaul Leader List. Performance indicators of 
villages are only appeared in Kyungsangnam-do Saemaul Leader List at a village level in 
1974 and 1975 while grant-awarded villages are listed in the Statistics Year book of 
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Kyungsangnam-do from 1974-79. Saemaul Chongram contains village information for all 
Korean villages in 1972. Since we merged three huge data sets based on Saemaul 
Chongram we easily matched the name of each village defined as Basic villages, Self-help 
villages, and Self-reliant villages with the name of villages awarded by government grants 
by creating dummies.  
The sample observations from Kyungsangnam-do are categorized by five groups based 
on the changes of village grade: no change, +1, +2, -1, and -2 (See Table 5). According 
to sample observation, the previous assumption 1 & 2 are wrong in that there are 26 
villages which are promoted more than 1 as well as the development level of 15 villages 
are retreated. However, we ignore these cases and consider as “no change”. Among 4,293 
villages which appear their Saemaul performance grade during 1974-75, only 15.7 percent 
are promoted. The greater part of rest villages are maintained their grade while only 1 
percent of villages are retreated (See Table 6).  
According to the sample observation from Saemaul yearbook from 1974 to 1979, the 
government provided Saemaul grants for 4,484 villages in Kyungsangnam-do (See Table 7). 
The number of grant awarded villages reached its peak in 1975. 949 villages are awarded 
in 1975 under the name of “first Saemaul project support (362)”, “second Saemaul project 
support (375)” and “outstanding village (212)”. 
Result
Among awarded villages, only 9.7 percent of 949 villages are promoted villages. 
Government grants are allocated to 90.3 percent of total awarded villages although they are not 
promoted. Among 857 villages which are granted but not promoted, 336 villages have maintain 
their development level ffffffffffffffffffffffas Self-help while 56 villages as Self-reliant from 
1974 to 1975. Even though 388 villages of total awarded villages are not observable, 469 
villages are still supported by Saemaul grants without better performance result. Furthermore, 
2,509 villages are not awarded despite the better result compared to the previous year (See 
Table 8).  
We obtained robust results in two different models. As a robustness check, we 
estimate government grant model by the OLS and Logit and also control village 
characteristics as well as township fixed effect. The estimates from both models tell a 
consistent story in that the signs of the coefficients are the same across models and the 
same variables are statistically significant in each model (See Table 9). Table 9 presents 
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that promoted villages are less likely to get the government grants in comparison to the 
villages not promoted. However, the estimate of Performance is not statistically significant. 
The marginal effects and average marginal effects are almost identical. Promoted villages 
are 0.4 percent less likely to be supported by the government grants (See Table 9). Again, 
the result is not statistically significant.      
Conclusion
In spite of the government documents regarding Saemaul Undong and statements from 
the Saemaul practitioners in the 1970s, in which the government selectively supported 
villages based on the performance of Saemaul projects, we could not find empirical 
evidence on it. According to the empirical investigation using the village-level data from 
Kyungsangnam-do province, it does not seem that the government provided supports only 
to the better-performing villages compared to the previous year’s performance. However, it 
does not necessarily mean that the government allocated development resources in an 
egalitarian manner or randomly. It seems that the government did not exclude the villages 
lagged behind with low performances in the community development program. 
The mechanism of the evaluation and rewards system in Saemaul Undong may not be 
so simple as we have thought to be so far. Thevgvvfre might arise occasions when the 
government allocated development resources partially taking into account other information 
and environment such as political situation, financial status of local government, 
region-specific factor or originally disadvantaged villages.
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Table 1| Criteria for Classification of Villages
Project Basic Self-help Self-reliant 
Village roads Construction of main village roads
Construction of small 
village roads     -
Farm roads Completion of main road to village
Completion of 
small farm roads     -





Irrigation rate 70 percent 70 percent 85 percent
Agricultural 






farming Cooperative working Cooperative production
Cooperative 
production
Village fund 300,000 Won 500,000 Won 1 million Won
Household income 500,000 Won 800,000 Won 1.4 million Won
Source: Author’s translation based on 10 Year History of Saemaul Undong by the Ministry of Home Affairs (1980)
Table 2| Village Development Level
36
Year
  Basic village     Self-help village      Self-reliant village Saemaul 
VillagesNo. of villages % No. of villages % No. of villages %
1972 18,415 53 13,943 40 2,307 7 34,665
1973 10,656 31 19,763 57 4,246 12 34,665
1974 6,165 18 21,500 62 7,000 20 34,665
1975 4,046 11 20,936 60 10,049 29 35,031
1976 302 1 19,049 54 15,680 45 35,031
1977 0 0 11,709 33 23,322 67 35,031
1978 0 0 6,114 18 28,701 82 34,815
1979 0 0 976 3 3,893 97 34,871
Source: 10 Year History of Saemaul Undong by the Ministry of Home Affairs (1980)
Table 3| Types of Government Grants
Year Category  Grant(KRW 1000)
Total grant
(KRW 1000)
 No. of 
awarded villages
1974
1st Saemaul project      500 - 1,500
9,118,952 6,364
2nd Saemaul project           1,000
Outstanding village




1st Saemaul project (railway)            500
6,961,763 6,266
1st Saemaul project (fishing village)            500




1st Saemaul project 1,000
11,697,356 8,672
2nd Saemaul project (railway) 500
2nd Saemaul project (fishing village) 500
2nd Saemaul project (mining village) 500
2nd Saemaul project (northern the river Han)
Rivulet arrangement 1,000 - 2,000
Outstanding village




Special training village 1,000
Rivulet arrangement 1,000 -3,000
Success case of village
Simultaneous support 3,000




Special training village 1,000




6,153,000 4,044Success case of village
Simultaneous support
Source: Reconstructed based on Saemaul Undong: from the beginning to today by the Ministry of Home Affairs 
(various volumes)
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Table 4| Income between Urban and Rural Area
Year Urban wage worker (A) Rural household (B) B/A (%)
1970 381,240 255,804 67.1
1971 451,920 356,382 78.9
1972 517,440 429,394 83.0
1973 550,200 480,711 87.4
1974 644,520 674,451 104.6
1975 859,320 872,933 101.6
1976 1,151,760 1,156,300 100.4
1977 1,405,080 1,432,800 102.0
1978 1,916,280 1,884,200 98.3
Source: 10 Year History of Saemaul Undong by the Ministry of Home Affairs (1980)
Table 5| Sample Descriptive Statistics on Performance Indicators in 
Kyungsangnam-do
No. Grade of 1974 Grade of 1975  grade No. of Villages Group Dummy
1
Basic
Basic No change 474 1 0
2 Self-help +1 226 2 1
3 Self-reliant +2 26 3 1
4
Self-help
Basic -1 13 4 0
5 Self-help No change 1,129 1 0
6 Self-reliant +1 113 2 1
7
Self-reliant
Basic -2 0 5 0
8 Self-help -1 2 4 0
9 Self-reliant No change 297 1 0





Basic 915 409 49 1,373
Self-help 39 2,091 216 2,346
Self-reliant 1 4 569 574
Total 955 2,054 834 4,293
Table 7| Types of Grants in Kyungsangnam-do
Type of grant 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
1st Saemaul project 272 362 17 - - -
2nd Saemaul project 272 375 426 - - -
3rd Saemaul project - - 85 - - -
Outstanding village 2 212 2 495 498 568
Rivulet arrangement 153 - 163 130 - -
Electrification 96 - 236 - - -
Success case of village - - - 2 1 1
Special training village - - - 40 40 -
Simultaneous support - - - 15 14 -
Total 802 949 929 682 553 569
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Increased 92 (9.7%) 2,509 2,601
Not increased 857 (90.3%) 3,150 4,007
Village total 949 (100%) 5,659 6,608
Table 9| The Estimates and marginal effects of Village Performance on Government Grants
Dependent variable: Government grant




Performance -0.0024 -0.0179 -0.0044
(0.0144) (0.129) (0.0314)
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Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The pseudo R-squared for the LPM is just the usual R-squared reported for 
OLS; for logit, the pseudo R-squared is the measure based on the log-likelihoods.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Figure 1| Number of Grant-awarded Villages and Total Grant Amount
Source: Author’s calculation based on “Saemaul Undong: from the Beginning to Today” by the Ministry of Home 
Affairs (various volumes)
















Source: “10 Year History of Saemaul Undong” by the Ministry of Home Affairs (1980)
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Appendix
Figure A1| Spatial Diffusion of Self-reliant Villages in Kyungsangnam-do
